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Intergroup relations are of crucial importance in contemporary times, with concerns
around social representations, social influence and collective action remaining salient.
A core aspect of intergroup conflict revolves around the notion of joint projects, whereby
different collectives seek to promote their own project through processes of joint
intentionality. Nonetheless, we contend that intergroup relations research can tackle
the notion of projects more fruitfully by studying the mutual understandings of projects
of groups in conflict. Accordingly, we propose an action-oriented reformulation for
intergroup relations research, which is contrasted with the standard object-oriented
formula. Object-oriented research either (a) emphasizes the study of social objects
without regard for their different construal by members of conflicting groups, or
(b) focuses on ‘social representations of’ the objects in question, without regard for
the projects that such representations serve. Contrastingly, action-oriented research
(a) seeks to understand a collective’s ‘social re-presentation for’ a specific project;
and (b) studies the social and alternative re-presentation of objects and projects as a
systemic product of intergroup relations. We then present illustrative examples of object-
oriented research, followed by a study concerning Arab-Maltese relations in Malta as an
example of action-oriented research. We end by making recommendations for future
research on intergroup relations, with the aim of shedding light on the processes that
bind coalitions for collective action.
Keywords: social representations, project, collective action, intergroup relations, alternative representations,
joint intentionality, social influence, conflict
INTRODUCTION: GROUPS IN CONFLICT
Intergroup relations remain a prevalent concern in many countries in Europe and beyond. Populist
and other movements contest regional and national definitions of identity as well as institutional
establishments. Similar contestations are evident as definitions of climate change, fair trade,
equality, political interference, and terrorism are contested around the world. Groups in conflict
build social psychological repertoires involving degrees of closed-mindedness and other cognitive
biases in the service of their aims (Bar-Tal, 2011, p. 11). Such repertoires do not simply include
attitudes and perceptions linked directly to the conflict, but also others carried over from contexts
prior to the conflict itself (Bar-Tal, 2011, p. 4). In the process, self-serving social psychological
processes (Ross and Nisbett, 2011) – such as naive realism (Ross and Ward, 1996) and the
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confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998) – can potentially result
in different construals (Ross and Ward, 1996) of the same
contested object. Groups in conflict often resist the view that
their outgroup’s actions are based on different understandings
of mutually relevant information (Robinson et al., 1995).
Rather, they assume that the outgroup’s views are biased,
misinformed, or downright ignorant (Ross and Ward, 1996;
Sammut and Sartawi, 2012). This promotes further inflexibility
in viewpoints, often fueling spirals of conflict between groups
(Sammut et al., 2015). Perceptions are thus a key concern in
intergroup conflict (Fisher and Kelman, 2011, p. 61), precisely
because without understanding perceptions it remains unclear
what the mutual concerns and attributions of both sides are.
Indeed, perceptions also feature centrally in contact and prejudice
research, which studies the possibility of conflict attenuation by
means of specified forms of intergroup contact (Dixon et al.,
2015). Such studies, and related studies of intergroup threats
as they unfold over spatial and temporal dimensions, have
been a cornerstone of research aimed at conflict resolution
(Dixon et al., 2019).
Alongside mainstream research, social representations theory
(SRT) has provided a useful framework for studying intergroup
relations. At the heart of SRT lies the view that “powerful
majorities attempt to define the meaning of new or otherwise
important information as a function of their group norms,
while subordinate minorities employ propaganda techniques
of social influence to resist majority influence and propose
alternative positions” (Staerklé et al., 2011, p. 759). Whilst various
definitions of social representations abound in the literature,
the systemic and functional aspects of social representations
transpire as core features. Sammut and Howarth (2014) define
social representations as “systems of communication and social
influence that constitute the social realities of different groups in
society [emphasis added]” (p. 1799–1800).
In this paper, we contend that intergroup relations research
can better tap into the systemic and functional aspects of
social representations than it has to date (cf. Wagner, 1998;
Sammut et al., 2012; Lopes and Gaskell, 2015). Essentially,
the question of how changes in social representations might
unfold as a function of minority/majority relations is yet to be
addressed (Marková, 2008). The processes by which different
groups promote contrasting representations of both (a) contested
objects and (b) contested projects, remain understudied in
intergroup relations research. We argue that intergroup relations
research benefits from an action-oriented social representations
formula that prioritizes the systemic and functional aspects
inherent in contrasting representations. Our proposal entails
a conception of social representations as being necessarily for
joint projects (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999; cf. Franks, 2011). By
foregrounding joint projects and collective action, we argue
that an action-oriented approach is better suited in addressing
key issues involving intergroup dynamics, both within and
outside of SRT. We contrast this approach with the prevailing
object-oriented view, which gives primacy to descriptions and
characterizations of objects being represented. We end by making
recommendations for future research. Throughout the paper, we
use ‘re-presentation’ to refer to social re-presentation as process,
and ‘representation’ to denote a social representation’s content
(see Chryssides et al., 2009).
INTERGROUP RELATIONS:
CONSTRUALS OF OBJECTS AND
PROJECTS
According to Bar-Tal (2011, p. 1), intergroup conflicts constitute
“situations in which two or more parties perceive that their goals
and/or interests are in direct contradiction with one another
and decide to act on the basis of this perception” (Bar-Tal, 2011,
p. 1). Such perceptions are underpinned by “universal cognitive
and motivational biases that characterize all human beings as
they are, in every context” (Bar-Tal and Halperin, 2011, p. 228).
Chief among these are naïve realism (Ross and Ward, 1996)
and motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Molden and Higgins,
2005). Naïve realism constitutes the belief that one sees things
objectively, and that others will have the same views if they
process the same information in an unbiased manner (Ross and
Ward, 1996, p. 110–111). Such beliefs are appreciable in the false
consensus effect, where individuals overestimate the popularity
of their choices (Ross et al., 1977), and in the hostile media
phenomenon, where groups attribute bias (favoring the other
side) to neutrally presented media content (Vallone et al., 1985).
By contrast, motivated reasoning refers to cognitive processes
that help us reach desired conclusions. “Directional goals [. . .]
affect people’s attitudes, beliefs, and inferential strategies in a
variety of domains” (Kunda, 1990, p. 493). These processes may
rest on the belief that one’s views, and those of one’s group,
are particularly objective. In turn, the “biased assimilation”
(Greitemeyer et al., 2009, p. 23) of new information in ways
consistent with our beliefs buttresses groups’ resources for
collective action in times of conflict.
Static Objects and Projects in Intergroup
Relations Research
Despite the underlying focus on conflict, very few studies have
included research designs that consider the specific localized
content involved in such universal psychological processes, such
as actual societal beliefs about the conflict or the outgroup
(Bar-Tal and Halperin, 2011, p. 229). This means that most
intergroup research to date has not tapped into the historicity
of conflict and how groups perceive relevant objects and the
goals of their outgroup. Researchers often focus on similar
objectifications of diverse phenomena in various domains. For
instance, a social object like Islam may be linked to Moroccans in
the Netherlands (Dekker and Van der Noll, 2012, p. 115), Turks
in Greece (Sakellariou, 2017) and Libyans in Malta (cf. Buhagiar
et al., 2018), despite the fact that the national groups involved
are widely disparate in various characteristics. Consequently,
Helbling (2012, p. 5) concludes that whether Islamophobia relates
to Muslims or immigrants from the Arab world is an open
question (Helbling, 2012, p. 5), especially since attitudes toward
the latter tend to be worse than toward Muslims per se (Bleich
and Maxwell, 2012, p. 45). A recent media analysis found striking
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similarities across six European countries (the United Kingdom,
France, Malta, Italy, Romania, and Greece) in representations of
Islam (Buhagiar et al., 2020). Such representations are anchored
in different objectifications and construals of Muslims and Islam,
and as such, these differences may be key to understanding
changing intergroup relations over time. Similarly, Muslim
communities re-negotiate representations of themselves and of
intergroup relations with non-Muslims as well (Sartawi and
Sammut, 2012). Our point here is that representations of the
object ‘Islam’ must be operationalized in ways that make sense
for the communities being studied, as opposed to glossing over
its different objectifications across contexts.
As with objects, projects advanced by majority and minority
groups cannot be operationalized in ways that ignore contexts
and collective beliefs (cf. Bar-Tal and Halperin, 2011, p. 229),
and that result in different construals by the parties concerned.
Bar-Tal’s (2011, p. 1) step-wise definition of conflict above
posits perception as a phenomenon prior to action. There has
therefore been a focus on “perceptions in conflict” (Fisher
and Kelman, 2011, p. 61), conceptualized as preceding the
projects themselves. At best, such research focuses on “perceptual
processes that can account for the impact of subjective factors
on conflict escalation and perpetuation: the formation of
enemy and self-images, and the resistance of these images to
contradictory information” (Fisher and Kelman, 2011, p. 64).
However, if group concerns do reflect motivated social cognition
(Kruglanski, 1996; Krochik and Jost, 2011, p. 147), then questions
of content must be tackled directly in research design, to
study how different projects are served precisely by such
cognitions. That is, how does the tailored re-presentation of
objects enable “freezing” (Kruglanski, 2004, p. 14) on one
specific project as opposed to another? For example, why
do Jewish stereotypes of Arabs exhibit themes of primitive
behavior (Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005), and which project
do such stereotypes advance: a one-state solution, a two-
state solution or some other project (cf. McDonald et al.,
2018)? Similarly, majority group members in the West tend
to favor assimilation or colorblindness over multiculturalism
(Verkuyten, 2014); nonetheless, “multiculturalism rather than
colorblindness can be reassuring for high majority group
identifiers” among Hindu majority members in Mauritius (Ng
Tseung-Wong and Verkuyten, 2018). Such findings may seem
anomalous, and a common practice is thus to include variables
such as national contexts as moderating variables (see Guimond
et al., 2014). However, we argue that contextualized projects
are key to understanding such apparent anomalies. Another
example concerns research on acculturation strategies (e.g.,
migrant integration, assimilation, etc.) and wellbeing in Canada
(Berry and Hou, 2016). Here, generalized operationalizations
of acculturation strategies and life satisfaction were used, even
though construals of integrationist projects may vary widely
across migrants. Yet, if groups construe projects differently
and attribute beliefs to their outgroup in conflictual relations,
then such construals are vital to understand intergroup
relations, and should feature in variable operationalization.
In summary, the above literature illustrates a key problem
concerning the assumption of unchanging representations of
objects and projects, whose understanding is deemed as being
interchangeable among different groups.
Objects Re-presented Without Projects
Much like mainstream research, SRT has sought to understand
how certain objects are represented differently by different
groups, with little regard for the projects being advanced. As
we detail hereunder, such research has pursued an implicit
object-oriented formula, which determines the focus of study
as: the social representations of X [object], held by Y [group],
in C [context]. This is the case in Moscovici’s (1961/2008)
classical study Psychanalyse, where the object of psychoanalysis
was studied in the French public as it is re-presented by
three distinct groups: Catholics, Communists, and Liberals.
Moscovici’s study was concerned with social representations of
psychoanalysis (Object X), by Catholics/Communists/Liberals
(Group Y), in 20th century France (Context C). Moscovici’s
original formulation compares the content of three somewhat
dissimilar social representations of psychoanalysis circulating in
the same French public at one point in time. This seems to suggest
that the object is represented differently by the three distinct
groups in the French public. The naïve citizen is thus faced
with three distinct social representations of psychoanalysis, as
though psychoanalysis were a different object to one group than
to another. Here, one should note that the preposition ‘of ’ does
not imply actual existence of the representation itself outside of
discourse (cf. Potter, 2019), separately from the object; the object
is simply “the inside-view or folk-expression for what a specific
representation stands” (Wagner, 1996, p. 115). Nonetheless, this
formula misses an understanding of why psychoanalysis is re-
presented the way that it is by a certain group. Possibly, a group
(e.g., Catholics) may re-present the object (i.e., psychoanalysis)
in reaction to some other interested group’s representation of
the object, as something that runs counter to the original group’s
project (e.g., taking one’s tribulations to the psychoanalyst rather
than the priest could be antithetical to the Catholic project).
Therefore, whilst intergroup dynamics are implicit in Moscovici’s
work, they were not methodologically exploited.
Moscovici’s (1961/2008) study was conducted in post-World
War II France, where strong Catholic and Communist bases
fought for hegemony in a political atmosphere influenced by
the cold war (Duveen, 2008, p. xv). Psychoanalysis became
an object through which such ideological battles were fought
(Duveen, 2008, p. xv). However, the hypotheses formulated are
almost exclusively dedicated to understanding the terms/themes
used to discuss psychoanalysis (e.g., Moscovici, 1961/2008,
p. xxxvi). That is, the focus was squarely on the object, with
analytical considerations of action and intergroup relations being
secondary. This meant that the study effectively remained silent
on how groups can renegotiate their appraisals of objects in
line with their projects and contextual demands over time. In
fact, Moscovici asks how it is that, years later, one observes an
improved relationship between Psychoanalysis and Communists
(Moscovici, 1961/2008, p. 343), driven by various events
including scholarly developments bridging both paradigms (p.
345). This blind spot may be the result of a synchronic focus on
‘social representations of Object X,’ as opposed to a longitudinal
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focus on ‘social re-presentation for Project P.’ Beyond the
assumption of unchanging objects and projects highlighted
above, this concern constitutes a second problem: that of studying
re-presented objects without analyzing which projects they serve.
We argue that a more nuanced appreciation of the relationship
between collective action and re-presentation can redress this
problem in intergroup relations research.
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND JOINT
INTENTIONALITY
The necessity of project-focused research can be highlighted
by making recourse to a central distinction between
“representations-of” and “representations-for”: the former
emphasize what is being re-presented whereas the latter
highlight what it is being re-presented for (Millikan, 1989, 1995;
Franks, 2011, p. 130). This distinction is best explained with
reference to Franks’ (2011, p. 130) example conceptualizing
retinal evolution as being driven by what the motor cortex
needs visual representations of the world for. Foregrounding
visual representations that are simply of the world leads to
questions concerning the degree of representational accuracy
needed for proper functioning. Contrarily, “representations-for”
relegate issues concerning the accuracy of visual (or other)
representations to a secondary role, and most importantly, fulfill
the requirements of the “representation consumer” (e.g., the
motor cortex) (Franks, 2011, p. 130). Applying this distinction to
SRT, social “representations-of” exemplify the problems faced by
studies such as Moscovici’s (1961/2008), whilst “representations-
for” emphasize the primacy of joint intentionality and collective
action as ultimate ends. We thus propose that studying
social representations as a collective property (see Harré, 1984) of
groups makes possible an understanding of social representations
as enablers of joint intentionality and action.
Joint intentions are ones where a single agent would not
suffice for their existence. Such intentions always involve more
than simply a collocation of individuals (Franks, 2011, p. 42).
For example, the intention to have dinner with friends is
contingent upon its being shared by two or more people
(Gilbert, 1989; Tomasello and Carpenter, 2007). To link joint
intentions with SRT, social representations should be understood
as collective – rather than distributive – properties of groups
(Harré, 1984). Distributive properties are those attributable to
individual members of a group: for example, the weight of
an army is a distributive feature, as all members of an army
weigh a certain amount and contribute to the overall weight. In
contrast, collective properties are not attributable to individual
members: for example, the tactical formation of an infantry in
battle is not attributable to individual soldiers, but rather to the
collective itself. Given that social representations are collective
phenomena in this sense, then individual members can jointly
position themselves for or against a representation because both
promoters and opponents of a representation can access it (see
Sammut, 2015).
Another feature of social re-presentation that accords
with this view is its tolerance for contradiction. Contrasting
representations may be discursively elaborated by the same group
in the service of a common goal (Potter and Litton, 1985).
Whether one identifies coherent notions or else emphasizes
contradictions in speech depends on one’s motivation (cf. Billig,
1987, p. 263). Coherence and contradiction are “competing
strategies” (p. 254) for influencing one’s audience. For instance,
Rose et al. (1995) note how in Nazi Germany, Jewish migrants
were seen as being both ardent communists and staunch
capitalists. Here, delineated common understandings of Object
X become a moot point. What is necessary for social action
is neither an exhaustive elaboration of social representations,
nor representational consistency (Fraser, 1994), but adequate
and sufficient re-presentation on which action can be based
and outcomes pursued (see Roqueplo, 1990; as cited in Lahlou,
2015, p. 201). For example, ‘Jews as communists’ and ‘Jews as
capitalists’ could both suffice to promote anti-Semitic projects.
Moreover, it is rarely possible to decouple descriptive features of
representations from prescriptive ones (Fraser and Gaskell, 1990;
Harré, 1998, p. 132; Moscovici, 2000, p. 21). This becomes evident
when one considers the range of qualitative methods employed
in SRT (e.g., interviews, focus-groups, etc.; Wagner et al., 1999)
and the results obtained. Presumably, participants contribute to
such studies principally, though by no means exclusively, by
describing their views on social objects rather than continuously
and explicitly prescribing courses of action entailing the object.
Nevertheless, a common normative thread is usually discernible
in the results of such studies, that is, respondents would be for
and against some course of action.
This understanding of ‘re-presentation for’ prioritizes the
systemic and functional aspects of social re-presentation, and
carries two key implications. Firstly, the functionality of
representations takes primacy over description. Representations
are primarily pragmatic (see Fiske, 1992) and only secondarily
concerned with semantic truth (Wagner and Hayes, 2005).
Therefore, social representations are real because people act
accordingly (Bauer and Gaskell, 2008), their “as if ” nature being
dependent on practical solutions (Wagner and Hayes, 2005).
Consequently, the “stickiness” of representational content (that
is, why some content retains a certain currency; Breakwell, 2014,
p. 126) is better explained with recourse to action trajectories
and contexts exterior to the object (cf. Bauer, 2015, p. 60).
This implication supports the inclusion of joint projects as
a third analytical component (i.e., together with ‘groups’ and
‘representations’) in research designs.
Secondly, joint projects (Bauer and Gaskell, 2008) need not
be made explicit to be actuated, and individuals need not act
explicitly to actualize representations (Wagner, 2015). If the
prescriptive side to re-presentation were constantly evident, its
strength would diminish accordingly, as the co-constructive
element inherent in re-presentation would be tainted at every
step by attributions of utilitarian intent. Consider the bilateral
straw man arguments partaking in alternative representations
within intergroup contexts. Alternative representations are
representations “of a potentially competing representation
from within a social representation” (Gillespie, 2008, p. 380).
Here, outgroup representations are invoked in a purposefully
simplistic manner, only to be easily dismissed in favor of
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the ingroup’s alternative. These representations contain
multiple implications (Moscovici, 1994) concerning outgroups.
They serve to coordinate action vis-à-vis that outgroup
by virtue of their prescriptive element being implicit in
their descriptive elaboration. For example, in Psychanalyse,
when Communists alternatively re-present psychoanalysis
as “American psychoanalysis,” this frames psychoanalysis
politically, putting it in direct opposition with Communist
goals (Gillespie, 2008). This highlights the salience of group
membership, and its implication for intergroup relations and the
policing of group boundaries. Similarly, outside of SRT, research
by Peery and Bodenhausen (2008) and Chen et al. (2018) in the
US showed a minority bias where multiracial participants were
more likely to be categorized as ‘black’ or ‘not white.’ However,
the samples barely included any black participants. Following
the logic of alternative re-presentation, it would be interesting
to see whether black participants would exhibit similar biases,
or else re-present multiracial faces and exhibit other biases in
accordance with different (implicit) projects instead.
Collective Action: SRT and Social Identity
Beyond SRT, a dominant approach that has theorized collective
action is that of social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel and Turner,
1979) and related models (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2008).
According to SIT, individuals want positive self-esteem and thus
engage in strategies aimed at enhancing/maintaining their self-
esteem. Such strategies include leaving a group and joining
another in order to forge a different social identity; direct
competition in pursuit of increased status; and creative re-
appraisals of one’s positive characteristics that help redefine one’s
identity in positive terms (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). van Zomeren
et al. (2008) developed the social identity model of collective
action (SIMCA) by incorporating identity, perceived injustice
and perceived efficacy as key variables in determining whether
people are more likely to engage in collective action. According
to SIMCA, identity predicts collective action in three ways. It
does so directly, indirectly by underpinning shared experiences of
injustice, and indirectly because the stronger one’s identification
with a group, the more efficacious one feels in bringing about
social change. In SIMCA, social identity predicts perceptions
of both injustice and efficacy (van Zomeren et al., 2008). More
recent work has incorporated identity, efficacy, emotion and
morality as key predictors in the model (van Zomeren, 2013) and
started addressing cultural variance (van Zomeren, 2019).
van Zomeren (2013, p. 385) notes that SIMCA “is not
grounded in a larger theory about human functioning”
and should be embedded into a more general theory. Our
contribution also highlights the opposite: SIMCA can benefit
from including more specific project-related variables that
clearly specify what courses of action individuals prefer over
others. These should be in line with strategies (national, local,
etc.) being discussed at the time, accessible by lay audiences.
Revealingly, van Zomeren et al. (2018) argue that “identity
content remains neglected in research on collective action,
notwithstanding the lip service paid to its presumed importance”
(van Zomeren et al., 2018, p. 127). They note how it might not
be categories themselves that motivate people for action, but
the content of such categories (van Zomeren et al., 2008, 2018).
The authors present examples, such as Becker and Wagner’s
(2009) observation that identification with the category ‘women’
can mean identification both with feminist or traditionalist
women, carrying substantial implications for research outcomes
(e.g., which gender roles one supports). The fact that identity
content is “assumed but not assessed, and interpreted but not
actually tested” (van Zomeren et al., 2018, p. 127) mirrors
our concern with operationalizations of collective action itself.
It is perhaps not collective action itself (as a general process
and undifferentiated outcome variable) that is intended for by
members of a group, so much as the fulfillment of contextualized
content-based projects.
Joint Projects
Action has been problematized by different traditions of research
within SRT and remains of concern (see Batel and Castro,
2018; Potter, 2019). These conceptualizations can advance our
understanding of collective action. Castro and Batel (2008) argue
that there are three ways of viewing action and re-presentation
within SRT. Firstly, the constitutivist view sees action as being
part and parcel of re-presentation (e.g., Wagner, 1996, 2015);
for example, the act of re-presenting Muslims as terrorists (e.g.,
Buhagiar et al., 2020) simultaneously achieves things in the world.
Secondly, the functional view conceptualizes re-presentation as
capable of serving certain functions and actuating things; this
accords with the view that “social representations are often only
apparent in action” (Howarth, 2006, p. 72). Here, the same
representation promotes courses of action over others but remains
separate from tangible courses of action (such as supporting
ethno-nationalist causes against Muslims). Thirdly, the creative
view emphasizes how re-presentation creates new possibilities of
behaving (Castro and Batel, 2008). For example, groups who re-
present Muslims as terrorists might commit ‘novel’ acts such as
avoiding travel to Muslim-majority countries altogether. These
proposals shed light on different aspects of re-presentation; they
need not be mutually exclusive. All three become meaningful
when understood in view of joint projects (Bauer and Gaskell,
1999), which, we contend, offer a viable and solid basis for the
proposed reformulation. It is “future-making” and ideological
activity (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 87) that make evident “the power
[of social representations] to shape mutual expectations within a
collective in such a manner as to enable or impede coordinated
actions directed toward a given purpose” (Elcheroth et al., 2011,
p. 745; see Howarth et al., 2014).
Bauer and Gaskell (1999, 2008) propose a “toblerone model”
of social re-presentation that features the notion of joint projects.
The toblerone model explains how subject-subject relations
temporally re-present objects to advance joint projects (Bauer
and Gaskell, 1999). An object is here defined broadly as either an
abstract notion or a concrete entity. Projects are the pragmatic
contexts within which joint sense-making and action occur
in a collective; they link subjects together within a common
trajectory (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999, 2008; Bauer, 2015). The
toblerone model defines re-presentation as a “time-gestalt of
‘inter-objectivity’ ” (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999, p. 171), framing
action and serving identity and memory functions within a
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community (Bauer, 2015). In this model, social representations
are trebly construed as incorporating representations of object,
project and subjects (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999); and subjects
within re-presentation are always a collective in the first-
person plural (Bauer and Gaskell, 2008), rather than atomized
individuals (see Harré and Secord, 1972; Wagner, 1996, 2015;
Marková, 2000). A project is necessarily joint; it does not simply
mobilize singular subjects based on their separate intentions.
This mobilization is teleological, projected toward desired states
of affairs that are inherent in there being a “not-yet” and a
“future-for-us” (Bauer and Gaskell, 2008, p. 343).
Later developments of the toblerone model included
multiple “toblerones” of different sizes, signifying power
relations between dominant and non-dominant groups (Bauer
and Gaskell, 2008). This consideration of power relations
introduced an explicit focus on intergroup dynamics in
SRT. The notion of joint projects allows for “a more explicit
conceptualization of action and interaction” (Foster, 2011,
p. 23.2). Under this view, re-presentation is always for
(Millikan, 1989, 1995; Franks, 2011, p. 130) some course
of action over another, evincing the claim that “theories on
SR [social representations] are also fundamentally theories
of social power” (Elcheroth et al., 2011, p. 747). This view
incorporates a more nuanced sensitivity for action, and can
shed light on dynamics of mobilization within and across
social movements. Nevertheless, social representations research
does not necessarily fulfill Bauer and Gaskell’s (1999, 2008)
aspirations, as detailed above. Social representations emerge,
reproduce and are challenged by means of “asymmetrical
intergroup communication and influence” (Staerklé et al.,
2011, p. 759). Yet, despite the relevance of conflict in SRT
(Elcheroth et al., 2011; Staerklé et al., 2011), intergroup
dimensions are not studied in terms of clashing projects.
We now proceed to synthesize the above review and present
both the object-oriented formula and our action-oriented
reformulation in more detail.
‘SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF. . .’:
OBJECT-ORIENTED RESEARCH
We term object-oriented any view that studies social
representations as being of Object X, held by Group Y, and
found in Context C. Symptomatic of this view are attempts at
fleshing out what the characteristics of social representations of
Object X might be, without studying why they are such. This
formula can thus portray social representations as static and
unitary entities (see Potter and Litton, 1985). The quintessential
example of a strong object-orientation involves operationalizing
social representations as discrete variables (see Marková, 2000).
This promotes an exclusively distributive view (Harré, 1984)
of social representations, which are to be “found” among a
determinable number of individuals, but absent in others.
Under this view, social representations are social simply because
they are present in more than one specimen. Object-oriented
views also typify much research where social representations
are understood as being mutually constitutive of social groups,
even if no case is made for treating representations as discrete
variables. Essentially, such research fits the following formula:
Social representations SRn of Object X, by Group Y, in
Context C
This formula excludes considerations of (a) the projects
being advanced, and (b) how different groups re-present objects
and the projects of their outgroups in ways that serve their
ingroup’s project.
Object-Oriented Research in SRT
Examples of object-oriented research abound in the literature.
We review work concerning the social representations of human
rights (Spini and Doise, 1998; Doise et al., 1999; Doise, 2002),
and more recent examples concerning social representations of
Latin American history (Brasil and Cabecinhas, 2017) and of
secularism (Troian et al., 2018). We also present illustrative
examples of mainstream object-oriented research concerning
perceptions in intergroup relations (Cvetkovska et al., 2020).
Social Representations of Human Rights
Spini and Doise (1998) hypothesize and show that the social
representations of personal and governmental involvement in
human rights have both an abstract and an applied dimension.
The authors state that social representations should be situated
“in the social history of individuals and groups” (Spini and Doise,
1998, p. 607). Nonetheless, little to no consideration is given as to
what the representations of human rights are for. Despite various
opportunities for discussing potentially contrasting projects and
their influence on the social re-presentation of human rights
among different collectives (e.g., Catholics, Protestants, etc., who
were present in the sample), the authors favor a research question
focusing on an amorphous “people” and their views. The authors
are clearly concerned with the following formulation:
Social representations SRn of Object X [human rights],
by Group Y [psychology/sociology/law students], in
Context C [Geneva]
Revealingly, Doise (2002, p. 143–144) notes that when
human rights issues are contextualized, social representations
change accordingly. For example, human rights violations can
be tolerated when the person in question occupies a marginal
social position. The more an issue is contextualized, the more
projects rise to the surface. However, Doise (2002) discusses
such “inconsistencies” (p. 145) in terms of rationalizations
and dissonance, instead of adopting a more ecological view
of reasoning (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002) across different
project-driven collectives. Our proposed reformulation here
recommends (a) a research design focused on projects in
which human rights are relevant. The authors note that human
rights are sometimes regarded as Western exports based on
Enlightenment ideas, and that “the more such ideas prevail in
a culture, the more positive attitudes should be toward [human
rights]” (Doise et al., 1999, p. 5). The exportation of human rights
discourse to other countries could have constituted the project
under investigation; it would have been fruitful to see whether,
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for example, universalist values (which are explored in the study)
serve to promote foreign interference. Secondly, the employment
of representations for or against the specified projects could have
been studied using (b) outcome measures that reflected such
projects, and (c) samples consisting of salient groups (relevant to
the research question) sharing a meaningful intergroup relation.
Social Representations of Latin American History
In contrast to Spini and Doise (1998); Brasil and Cabecinhas
(2017), in their study on social representations of Latin American
history, explicitly note how collective memory serves “to mobilize
the sense of belonging to the ingroup, contributing to the
tendency of group members to engage in collective projects
due to their shared belonging” (Brasil and Cabecinhas, 2017,
p. 540). The authors conducted a survey with Chilean, Brazilian
and Mexican students, asking them to list events/personalities
they deemed as being the most historically important, and to
indicate the influence they thought such events/personalities had
on Latin American history. The students emphasized conflict-
related and political events, events related to colonialism, and
country-specific events. The latter finding was taken as evidence
for a sociocentric bias. The authors further note that “social
representations of history may serve as a tool to segregate and
reinforce stereotypes” (Brasil and Cabecinhas, 2017, p. 551).
Nonetheless, this study essentially looked at:
Social representations SRn of Object X [Latin American
history], by Group Y [Chilean/Brazilian/Mexican students], in
Context C [online context]
Despite mention of projects and social representations of
history acting “as a tool” (Brasil and Cabecinhas, 2017, p. 551),
it is not clear against or for whom this tool is used. This is
even more pressing given that collective memory “is one of
the major epistemic bases for delineating courses of action and
motivating mobilization” (Bar-Tal, 2014, p. 5.4). Here, it would
have been suitable to (a) focus on intergroup reconciliation
between colonizers and the colonized, which is at times alluded
to in the manuscript, or any other relevant project. The authors
argue that certain representations of history “could also be a way
of blaming the Other (in this case, the countries that were once
the colonizers) for the difficulties that the individuals from this
region face today” (Brasil and Cabecinhas, 2017, p. 552). Thus,
there was the possibility of operationalizing a key project sensible
to the Latin American context vis-à-vis past colonizers. How
colonizers and the colonized alternatively re-present each other’s
project is also key to understanding social representations “as a
tool.” Secondly, (b) this study could have analyzed the uses of
history by incorporating outcome measures aimed at getting both
groups’ views, and their views of each other’s views on the project
in question. Thirdly, (c) sample constitution could have reflected
both groups in question.
Social Representations of Secularism
Troian et al. (2018, p. 96) test whether social representations of
secularism serve as a “legitimizing myth” promoting prejudice
toward North African minorities, and whether “new secularism”
(i.e., the view that persons should be laic and religious symbols
excluded from public life) mediates the relationship between
social dominance orientation (SDO; Sidanius and Pratto, 2001)
and prejudice. This bears “important stakes in the present
political and societal situation (i.e., controversies surrounding
the ‘burkini’ and the following discriminatory practices of civil
servants toward minorities)” (Troian et al., 2018, p. 102). The
authors distributed a survey including a Secularism scale, an SDO
scale and a Generalized Prejudice scale (Dambrun and Guimond,
2001). This study thus related to:
Social representations SRn of Object X [Secularism], by Group
Y [French people], in Context C [France]
To account for motivated reasoning, the research design could
have benefitted (a) by incorporating explicit projects relating to
North Africans in France: do native French participants (without
North African descent) favor migrant assimilation, repatriation,
integration, or other acculturation strategies? Instead of static
depictions of “representations of secularism,” the strategies for
which such representations might be employed could have
been a fruitful addition to the tested mediation model, where
(b) the outcome measure becomes that of a contextualized project
rather than generalized prejudice. Moreover, looking at what
North Africans think about such projects, and how they in turn
re-present secularism for/against them is also recommended.
Finally, (c) asking both groups about their views of each other’s
projects would have captured the systemic element endemic to
social re-presentation. Collecting data from “civil servants [and]
minorities” (Troian et al., 2018, p. 102) is equally pertinent.
Mainstream Object-Oriented Research:
Toleration and Group Identification
Cvetkovska et al. (2020) recently published an interesting study
concerning relations between toleration, well-being, and group
identification among minorities in the Netherlands. Toleration
was associated with higher well-being through higher national
identification. Interestingly, statistical associations between well-
being, group identification and toleration tended to fall between
the associations of such measures with either discrimination
or acceptance. Viewing acceptance (rather than toleration or
discrimination) as the most adequate descriptor of ingroup
treatment was associated with higher national identification.
Contrastingly, discrimination was associated with stronger
ethnic identification. The authors argue that “this suggests
that toleration gives less impetus to use one’s ethnic group
as a resource for improving one’s well-being, compared to
being overtly discriminated against” (Cvetkovska et al., 2020,
p. 166). However, an alternative explanation could be that
high ethnic identification (group) pushes group members to
re-present perceived intergroup relations (object) as something
else other than a situation involving toleration (e.g., as one
involving discrimination). The project advanced by those with
higher ethnic identification could be different than that advanced
by those with lower ethnic identification or higher national
identification. Hence, minorities may shift alliances between
ethnic and national groups given the project they seek to advance.
More alignment with the national group means that a situation
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of more intergroup acceptance is perceived (object), advancing
Project X (e.g., the project of Laïcité in France, for secularism
at a national level). Similarly, higher alignment with one’s ethnic
group means that the same situation is perceived as involving
more discrimination (object), thus advancing Project Y (e.g., the
project of recognizing and having a legitimate place for Muslim
practices). The authors instead argue for a reparative view of
identification, where perceptions of ingroup treatment somewhat
took precedence over group identification: “it may be that one
cannot help but feel negative emotions when perceiving one’s in-
group to be discriminated against. Ethnic group identification
may restore positive feelings of self-esteem and connection”
(Cvetkovska et al., 2020, p. 170). Essentially, this research fits the
following formula:
Social representations SRn of Object X [toleration/
discrimination/acceptance], by Group Y [Turkish/Moroccan/
Antillean/Surinamese minorities], in Context C [Netherlands]
AN ACTION-ORIENTED
REFORMULATION
As highlighted above, motivated social cognition (Kunda,
1990; Kruglanski, 1996; Molden and Higgins, 2005) is key to
understanding intergroup relations. It follows that a primary
focus on objects or perceptions themselves can limit the
capacity to account for disparate findings across domains,
even if causal explanations demonstrate the functionality of
attitudes/perceptions. Our proposal is applicable to various
domains where perceptions in intergroup relations have an
impact on behavioral outcomes. A statement by Adelman et al.
(2019) can be used to illustrate this point: “motivated reasoning
may not only influence when we assign [judgments to groups],
but also how it shapes the perception of the nature of the
group in question to be consistent with the judgment [itself]”
(Adelman et al., 2019, p. 37). This begs the following question:
why isn’t the whole reasoning process described by Adelman
et al. (2019) itself conceptualized as motivated reasoning, with
its motivating cause being an underlying project (which would
have to be tested experimentally)? In other words, to what
end is such reasoning motivated? Having conceptualized social
re-presentation as being for joint projects, we now propose a
reformulation that (a) is action-oriented, and (b) furthers the
study of joint projects and alternative re-presentation (Gillespie,
2008) in intergroup scenarios.
‘Social Re-presentation for. . .’
In applying the distinction between “representations-of”
and “representations-for” to social re-presentation, the
object-oriented view (“Social representations SRn of Object
X, by Group Y, in Context C”) can be reformulated as follows:
Social re-presentation SR for Project P, of/as Object O, by
Group G1, in Context C. . . according to Group Gx...n
This systemic formula (a) foregrounds social re-presentation
as process, serving collective functions (“Social re-presentation
SR”); (b) incorporates action (“for Project P”); (c) expands
upon variants of re-presentation, allowing for both realist and
social constructionist emphases (“of/as Object O”); (d) redefines
groups as joint subject-subject relations on a collective level
(“Group G1”) (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999); and (e) allows for
the alternative re-presentation of project trajectories by multiple
groups relevant to Context C (“according to Group Gx...n”). The
point we wish to make here is that the motivational basis for
transforming certain ideas into social representations can only
be substantiated with reference to what representations are for
(cf. Jahoda, 1988).
‘Alternative Re-presentation for. . .’
Social representations theory studies situations where groups
intersect and resist each other, and knowledge encounters
play out in public spheres (Bauer, 2015, p. 61; Jovchelovitch
and Priego-Hernández, 2015, p. 167). It is divergent practices
that make social representations visible (Bauer and Gaskell,
1999). Social groups and their projects are always vulnerable
to alternative re-presentation by outgroups (Gillespie, 2008),
and these in turn can be resisted or engaged with in various
ways (Jovchelovitch and Priego-Hernández, 2015, p. 173).
The present reformulation incorporates social representations
alongside alternative representations that may interrelate to and
fro across social groups longitudinally. It enables research of
a group’s reactions to the alternative representations leveled at
it by its outgroup(s), and vice versa. Expanding upon Bauer
and Gaskell’s (1999) systemic conception, the reformulation
addresses: “how in the object, the project of the subjects is
represented; or how in the subjects the object appears in relation
to a project; or how the project links the subjects and the object”
(Bauer and Gaskell, 1999, p. 168), as per the following formula:
SR for Px...n, as a function of SR1, AR2, AR1n, SR2, AR1, AR2n
and any other SRn and ARn relevant to the context
Thus, if one were to focus on “how in the object, the
project of the subjects is represented” (Bauer and Gaskell,
1999, p. 168), one can substitute P1 for Px...n to consider the
formula specifically from the viewpoint of G1. Here, social re-
presentation for P1 by G1 (SR for Px...n) is a function of (a)
how G1 socially re-presents the Object/s in question (SR1); (b)
how G1 alternatively re-presents the Project of its outgroup
(AR2) and that of other relevant groups (AR1n); (c) how the
outgroup socially re-presents the Object/s in question (SR2);
(d) how the outgroup alternatively re-presents the Project of
G1 (AR1) and that of other relevant groups (AR2n); and (e)
so on for any other relevant groups in the same context (SRn
and ARn). In being advanced, P1 potentially incorporates or
interrelates with other functionally relevant viewpoints in a
systemic gestalt. Equally, if one were to focus on “how in the
subjects the object appears in relation to a project; or how the
project links the subjects and the object” (Bauer and Gaskell,
1999, p. 168), the formula can work without tying Px...n to
any specific group.
In line with the toblerone model (Bauer and Gaskell,
1999, 2008), the fuzzy conceptual nature of the formula
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components, particularly Object O, means that these can
only be defined with reference to the project (Px) as it is
embedded in subject-subject relations (Gx). Contrary to
object-oriented formulations, alternative re-presentation is
conceptually linked to an outgroup’s Project in intergroup
scenarios. Projects are questioned from without, and alternative
representations of relevant objects follow suit. This mode of
enquiry provides a neater solution to the question concerning
how collectives use representations multifariously for specific
ends (Jahoda, 1988). Accordingly, this systemic reformulation
promotes researching the dynamism of collectives and their
project/s over time, seeking to understand how collective
projects shape and are in turn shaped by intergroup relations.
We now proceed to present an illustrative study showing





We conducted research (Buhagiar et al., 2018; Sammut
et al., 2018) concerning social re-presentation for migrant
integration, using the above reformulation. Specifically, we
looked at how the Maltese socially re-present the project
of Arab integration in Malta. Interviews were conducted
asking Maltese participants for their views concerning the
integration of Arabs. Questioning was thus squarely focused on
a project (integration) and the interviews engaged participants
in argumentation. Participants were asked for their viewpoints,
justifications, examples, qualifiers and exceptions to their
central claims. We therefore studied “how in the subjects
[Maltese] the object [Arabs] appears in relation to a project
[integration]; or how the project [integration] links the
subjects [Maltese] and the object [Arabs]” (Bauer and Gaskell,
1999, p. 168).
In essence, our study (Sammut et al., 2018) adopted an
action-oriented empirical focus. The findings resulted in a wide
array of pro- and anti-integrationist arguments, clustered around
several themes. There was a predominance of anti-integrationist
arguments, and whilst most argumentative themes traversed
positive, ambivalent and negative stances toward integration, no
positive religious arguments for Arab integration were made
(Sammut et al., 2018). The action-oriented focus thus helped,
crucially, “to identify instances where certain semiotic resources
might be absent in certain social representations” (Sammut
et al., 2018, p. 8), perhaps because such content would directly
oppose the project being advanced. Among the arguments
concerning integration, we highlighted those converging around
socio-political themes. For instance, Arabs were re-presented
as longstanding trade partners, serving to promote the benefits
of Arab integration in Malta (Sammut et al., 2018). Here, the
emphasis was on the economic benefits of integration and
the possibility of co-existence, as evidenced by a history of
Arab-Maltese relations. Accordingly, this social re-presentation
comes together in view of an integrationist project, and can be
formulated as follows:
Social re-presentation SR [Arabs as trade partners] for
Project P [integration], of/as Object O [Arabs], by Group
G1 [Maltese], in Context C [Malta]. . . according to Group
Gx...n [Maltese]
Moreover, as per our second proposed formula, an action-
oriented approach allows for further consideration of alternative
re-presentation and intergroup dynamics, both of which can
modify the social re-presentation processes under study. This
research is being developed by posing the same questions
to Arabs, to investigate their social re-presentation of the
integrationist project. Future research will also address alternative
re-presentation by asking Maltese respondents what they think
Arabs make of integration, and Arab respondents what they think
the Maltese make of integration. This overarching programmatic
endeavor can be expressed as follows:
SR for Pintegration, as a function of SRM, ARA, ARMn,
SRA, ARM, ARAn and any other SRn and ARn relevant to
the context
Here, the integrationist project (Pintegration) is a function of
(a) how the Maltese socially re-present Arabs in Malta (SRM)
and alternatively re-present their project (ARA) and that of
other relevant groups (ARMn), and (b) how Arabs socially re-
present themselves in Malta (SRA) and alternatively re-present
the project of the Maltese (ARM) and that of other relevant groups
(ARAn). This aligns with Tajfel’s (1984, p. 696) view of social
representations as a collective background mobilizing intergroup
relations; and provides a way for studying changes in social
representations that unfold as a function of minority/majority
relations (Marková, 2008).
This research program studies how perpetual re-articulation
of others’ projects can in turn serve one’s own. Had our
study adopted an object-oriented design, it would have chiefly
focused on social representations of ‘Arabs’ amongst ‘the Maltese’
in Malta. The research would have tied itself closely to the
Object, whereas the fuzzy nature of the Object might be
precisely what is exploited in intergroup scenarios in order
to legitimize one’s project over others’ (see Table 1). For
instance, whether interviewees speak about ‘Arabs,’ ‘Arabs in
Malta,’ ‘Arabs in Europe,’ ‘Arab-Maltese relations’ or even specific
Arab nationalities, can differ across groups advancing contrasting
projects. Were the focus to be on the object, the interviewer
and interviewee might have still reached an understanding
concerning the topic of discussion. However, asking about a
project achieved this and even more. For instance, the focus
on joint projects also allowed for an abductive analysis that
showed how arguments from cultural essentialism advance anti-
integrationist projects (Buhagiar et al., 2018). This argumentation
strategy involved reducing Arabs to their cultural dimension,
which was seen as having a determinist influence on Arabs in
a persistent manner over time and as opposing Maltese culture
(Buhagiar et al., 2018).
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TABLE 1 | Differences between the object-oriented and the action-oriented
approach to social psychological research.
Feature Empirical orientation
Object-oriented Action-oriented
Object Representations of the object
are foregrounded in the
research design
Representations of the object
are not foregrounded in the
research design
Project Projects are treated post hoc, if
at all
Projects are foregrounded in
the research design






Lack of analytical third factor:
group-representation
correspondence




Pluralities Prone to distributive view; may






















May feature as a matter of
happenstance





Main focus on comparisons
between group representations;
intergroup relations treated
post hoc, if at all
Main focus on interaction
between group projects;
intergroup relations central
Social influence Non-systemic Systemic
This table compares the object-oriented approach with the action-oriented
approach on 10 key points.
Additionally, asking about the ‘integration of Arabs’ cut to
the chase, allowing the interviewees themselves to elaborate
the object from whichever angle they preferred. This shed
light on which emphases advance specific projects over others.
Mutual understanding between interviewer and interviewee is
not compromised given that the project in question is signified
by a lay term or else by one that has penetrated the consensual
sphere. ‘Integration’ makes lay sense in the present socio-
political climate of Malta, having infiltrated common parlance.
By asking about integration, participants’ views were expressed
more cogently, with representations of the object following suit:
in advancing integration, Arabs were construed as an asset
in Maltese-Arab relations (Sammut et al., 2018); in resisting
integration, Arabs were culturally essentialized (Buhagiar et al.,
2018), and so on.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we revised two formulas for intergroup relations
research. The first formula directed intergroup relations research
from focusing on ‘social representations of ’ to focusing on
‘social re-presentation for,’ foregrounding functionality. In turn,
the second formula elaborated upon the first by formulating
the project as a function of intergroup relations, prioritizing
the systemic nature of social/alternative re-presentation. In
essence, object-oriented and action-oriented approaches differ
in their understanding of 10 key points: the object; the project;
action; the analytical frame employed; the nature of pluralities;
representational stickiness; intergroup relations; conceptions of
social representations; conceptions of alternative representations;
and the nature of social influence (see Table 1).
As detailed above, the difficulties of an object-orientation
are threefold: (a) an omission of concerns with varying
representations of objects and projects in mainstream research;
(b) ambiguity or neglect concerning the collective nature of
social re-presentation (Harré, 1984), specifically as pertaining
to joint intentionality (Tomasello and Carpenter, 2007); and
(c) an omission of considerations of the social/alternative re-
presentation of joint projects (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999). We
have argued that an action-oriented reformulation addresses
these issues in ways amenable to improved empirical research.
Action-oriented research better elucidates how the functions of
representations change for groups over time–a poorly researched
area of inquiry (Breakwell, 1993). The emerging view is one where
social re-presentation binds coalitions for action. Coalitions re-
present objects for joint purposes, in ways that accord with their
surrounding sociocultural context (Sammut and Buhagiar, 2017),
mobilizing subjects for joint action.
We also note that this view of re-presentation serves synthetic
roles (cf. Parker, 1987; Bauer and Gaskell, 2008). It promotes a
rapprochement between SRT and evolutionary social cognition
on the one hand, and between SRT and discursive psychology
(DP) on the other (see Batel and Castro, 2018). The link with
evolutionary social cognition lies in a common functionalist
basis, sharing the view that “thinking is for doing” (Fiske,
1992, p. 877). Whilst reproductive fitness signifies a distinct
type of functionalism, it is wholly compatible with functionalist
psychological approaches studying goals and motivated processes
(Neuberg and Schaller, 2015, p. 9).
SRT and Discursive Psychology
The link with DP is more nuanced. DP is already premised
on the indispensability of action-oriented views of discourse
(Heritage, 1984), where discourse is seen as having primarily
practical consequences (Wetherell and Potter, 1988, p. 168).
This paper builds on the convergences between SRT and DP
(Batel and Castro, 2018) by incorporating functional concerns
in the analysis. Under the action-oriented reformulation, re-
presentational activity is conceptualized as furthering projects
in line with ideological concerns. The focus on projects
reconciles SRT with Billig’s notion of ideological dilemmas (Billig
et al., 1988), where different projects might be constitutive of
different ideological strands pulling collectives in contrasting
representational trajectories. This can either result in conflicting
ideological trajectories within the same collective project, or
else in a situation involving conflicting projects altogether (cf.
Billig et al., 1988). This constitutes a key point of convergence
between SRT and DP, where ideology is already a central concern
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(cf. Billig, 1991; Batel and Castro, 2018). Moreover, we agree
with Potter (2019) that analytic methods like thematic analysis
are too coarse for appreciating the functions of language: the
horizontal structure of most thematic maps does not highlight
the causes being advanced by interlocutors. One strength of
SRT was that “it highlighted the significance of representations
for action” (Potter, 2019, p. 410). However, Potter argues that
there are “confusions over what the representation is, where
it is, and what its role is” (Potter, 2019, p. 411). We believe
that our action-oriented reformulation provides the answer: re-
presentation is the building block of discourse, is found wherever
discourse is (i.e., “embedded in actions, sequences, and everyday
and institutional practices”; Potter, 2019), and has the role of
actuating joint projects, shared by members of a collective.
Moreover, as per our research above, researchers can map
interlocutors’ discourse into claims, analyzing what these claims
are for. Our approach adds the realization that the end goal of
discourse ultimately lies outside of it: discourse is motivated and
framed in line with joint projects. DP’s historical stance against
cognitivism (see Edwards, 2012; Augoustinos, 2017) limits its
possibilities for studying motivated reasoning. Yet, to understand
why people are talking about, say, climate change in the way they
are, the text itself cannot be the final litmus test.
Recommendations for Future Research
Before concluding, we make a few recommendations for action-
oriented social psychological research. These concern (a) how
to frame research questions; (b) how to incorporate contextual
factors in research; and (c) research design more broadly. It
is recommended that research questions be as specific to the
context as possible. Whereas universal cognitive processes are
important (Bar-Tal and Halperin, 2011, p. 228), contextualized
research questions/outcome measures approximate local projects
more. General outcome measures can be more sensitive to social
desirability biases (e.g., Campbell and Herman, 2015; van Niekerk
and Verkuyten, 2018), further consolidating the need for context-
specific measures. Research questions in intergroup relations
should foreground the ways that outgroups alternatively re-
present each other’s projects. Such questions can be reflected in
measures such as: “What do you think [Outgroup X] thinks about
[Project P]?”
This form of questioning only makes sense if contextual
factors are incorporated in research. Qualitative work – whether
naturalistic (Potter, 2019) or self-report (e.g., in-depth
interviews) – can precede quantitative work and inform scale
formation and survey composition, such that these then make
sense for all groups being studied. This means revising the
assumption of universalism and utilization of hybrid samples.
A scale can be built based on qualitative data from groups in
conflict and scaled such that it measures support for or against
Project P. It can then be administered, asking both groups what
they think, and what they think their outgroup thinks. This
provides reliable and ecologically valid data. In cases where
relevant projects are difficult to identify, open-ended questioning
and subsequent analytical categorizations can help formulate
outcome measures relevant to the context.
CONCLUSION
The historicity intrinsic to social re-presentation (Villas Bôas,
2013) and social psychology more generally (Gergen, 1973; Billig,
2018; Wagoner and Brescó de Luna, 2018) validates the action-
oriented formula, as this provides a skeleton for carrying out
longitudinal research tracing joint projects (Sammut et al., 2012;
Bauer, 2015, p. 57). Our reformulation shifts the research focus
away from the automatic centrality of representational content,
and looks at how dominant and subordinate groups re-define the
meaning of contextual objects in view of their own motivated
reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Molden and Higgins, 2005), and given
their different resources (Staerklé et al., 2011). It is hoped that
the proposed reformulation provides a way precisely to study this
oft-neglected dynamic.
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